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Abstract
Although the infl uence of various Western countries, especially that of the United States, is 
still substantial, the stars of China, India, Russia, Brazil and other large developing states are 
rising. Within international organisations this trend has become visible through a growing 
reluctance of non-Western states to accept and go along with the political, legal and economic 
diktats of European and American-fl avoured recipes and policies. This trend also has an 
impact on the compliance of international organisations with rule-of-law conceptions, which 
are not universal but depart from the cultural and national assumptions embraced mostly 
in Western countries. Even though the legality of international organisations may not be 
disputed as such in non-Western countries, the administrative and cultural acceptance of 
these organisations often remains questionable. This undermines the conception and the 
functioning of the rule of law at the international level.
 One of the ways in which acceptance of the rule of law can be enhanced at the international 
level is by utilising a method known as ‘institutional transplantation’. This method aims to 
facilitate new legal and policy initiatives through an adoption process in which the chances of 
achieving political and cultural congruence and desirability are maximised. After presenting 
the six principles underlying this approach, this article examines the case of the World Bank’s 
Inspection Panel, in order to show how these principles can be applied in practice.
1 Introduction
The most articulate spokesperson for the cause of terminating Western arrogance 
in international politics is probably Singaporean ex-minister and current professor 
of public policy Kishore Mahbubani. In his well-known publications Can Asians 
Think?1 and The new Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to 
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1 K. Mahbubani, Can Asians Think? (New York, Marshall Cavendish Editions 2005, 3rd ed.).
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the East,2 he has drawn attention to the fact that the dominance of North America and 
Europe, at least in its undisputed form, in terms of economic hegemony, demographic 
expansion and, increasingly, military might, has been evaporating in the past few 
decades. This gradual erosion is likely to result in revised geopolitical relations and 
a change in the say that various players have in rules for international decision-
making and economic policies. According to Mahbubani, Western governments and 
industries are deluding themselves and will pay a high price if they deny this shift and 
look away from its consequences, hang on to their substantial overrepresentation in 
international organisations and continue to claim moral superiority in legal, political 
and economic thought. Although Mahbubani may be among the fi rst Asians to 
openly reaffi rm Asian power and take pride in the region’s regained self-confi dence, 
he is far from being the fi rst to make such statements. In fact, a famous but often 
controversial American ex-adviser to President Jimmy Carter and Harvard political 
scientist, Samuel Huntington, already pointed to similar issues in the early 1990s. 
Huntington’s best known monographs were entitled The Clash of Civilizations3 
and Who Are We? America’s Great Debate.4 American and European liberals have 
criticised them for emphasising rather than bridging cultural cleavages and making 
life harder for multiculturalists by accusing them of a lack of loyalty to Western 
and/or Christian civilisation. However, Huntington has documented his claims of 
declining Western infl uence and more balanced power relations in the world with 
abundant statistics and powerful examples. Behind his Christian parochialism 
and aversion to cosmopolitanism, a powerful interpretation of economic, military, 
demographic, cultural and linguistic data can be found.
 The analysis of scholars such as Huntington and Mahbubani is based on reasoning 
relating to the waxing and waning of world powers and/or civilisations. Although their 
reading and interpretation of the data they have studied differ markedly, a bottom-
line that they will all to some extent subscribe5 to is the willingness of dominant yet 
declining powers to learn and absorb knowledge and wisdom from less infl uential but 
growing countries. However obvious this seems, it has always appeared a challenge 
for them, because world hegemony almost naturally goes together with haughtiness 
and lack of interest in what other peoples and tribes have to offer. This haughtiness 
is not only potentially dangerous for the geopolitical credibility and acceptance of 
Western societies, but countless normative arguments can also be raised against 
ignoring recessive voices when constructing the global legal, political and economic 
order.
 These shifting geopolitical relations form the background of this article. Our 
purpose is to analyse the meaning of the theory on institutional transplantation for the 
establishment of international organisations in accordance with the rule of law, i.e. 
the establishment of legitimate international organisations. For this purpose, we have 
selected the case of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, whose recent establishment 
constitutes an institutional innovation in terms of the establishment of international 
organisations.
 The Inspection Panel was created to investigate complaints of private parties who 
claim to have suffered negative effects from World Bank projects, which in practice 
are carried out mainly in developing countries. The establishment of this Panel is 
hailed by some as the beginning of a more socially responsive approach on the part 
2 K. Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East (New 
York, Public Affairs 2008).
3 S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York, Simon & 
Schuster 1996).
4 S. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York, Simon & 
Schuster 2004).
5 For example, R. E. Bissell, ‘Recent Practice of the Inspection Panel of the World Bank’ (1997) 
91(4) American Journal of International Law 741-744.
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of global economic institutions. However, others have attacked it as a sham because 
of its dependent position and restricted legal powers.6 Therefore, the Inspection Panel 
is a suitable object of analysis and reasoned speculation on the possible development 
of legitimate global legal governance.
 To substantiate our argument, we will fi rst present the basic tenets of institutional 
transplantation and explain its implications for the ‘rule of law’ at the international 
level and its application in international law and international organisations (sections 
2 and 3). We subsequently take the main lessons on institutional transplantation as 
they are known in the literature on state-to-state transplantation and transpose them 
to heuristics for institutional transplantation at the international level (section 4). In 
section 5, we explain the workings of the World Bank Inspection Panel and point 
out what strengths and weaknesses can be found in its current formal and informal 
institutional position according to scholars of law and public policy. In addition, 
we survey the institutional position of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel and what 
is known of its work practice. In section 6, we apply the method of institutional 
transplantation to the case at hand. Finally, equipped with the insights obtained in 
this particular case, we present the main implications of our fi ndings. It appears that 
the ‘rule of law’ as normally understood by Western political and legal thinkers is 
taken as an absolute given with universal applicability. This position can actually 
preclude constructive international dialogue. However, if the rule of law is adopted 
as a political ideal and regarded as a means rather than an end, a discussion can 
evolve from which various participants can draw lessons and on the basis of which a 
legitimate international organisation can be established (section 7).
2 International Financial Institutions and Geopolitical Relations
The two main international fi nancial institutions (IFIs), the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank, originated in the immediate post-war period and can be 
seen as refl ecting the geopolitical relations existing in those days. Western countries 
(especially the United States) have disproportionate voting power in their general 
councils and are represented in their management and their research and project staff 
to a degree far exceeding their demographics and economic power.7 The benefi ts 
for non-Western countries of Western legal, political and economic ideologies 
promoted by the above-mentioned international organisations have for a long time 
gone undisputed, but are now coming under increasing attack. Infl uential scholars, 
such as political philosopher John Gray, in his False Dawn: The Delusions of Global 
Capitalism and Two Faces of Liberalism,8 and former World Bank senior economist 
William Easterly, in The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the 
Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good,9 have been vocal in claiming that, 
whatever the merits of free-market economies may be (and they can be considerable 
when combined with strict state control over basic property rights and anti-monopoly 
issues), it is impossible to impose them on societies where informal trust relations 
6 For example, A. Orakhelashvili, ‘The World Bank Inspection Panel in Context’ (2005) 2 
International Organizations Law Review 57-102; and E. Nurmukhametova, ‘Problems in Connection 
with the Effi ciency of the World Bank Inspection Panel’ (2006) 10 Max Planck Yearbook of United 
Nations Law 397-421.
7 N. Woods, ‘The Challenge of Good Governance for the IMF and the World Bank Themselves’ 
(2000) 28(5) World Development 823-842; and N. Woods, ‘Making the IMF and the World Bank More 
Accountable’ (2001) 77 (1) International Affairs 83-100.
8 J. Gray, False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism (New York, The New Press 1999); and 
J. Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism (New York, The New Press 2002).
9 W. Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why The West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much 
Ill and So Little Good (London/New York, Penguin Books 2006).
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between business partners are organised differently or where dominant social groups 
grasp power in large fi rms when they are rapidly privatised under pressure. Such 
forced ‘Westernisation’ often has negative rather than positive consequences, since 
the formal and informal rules of the game are incongruent. In Beyond Liberal 
Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context,10 Daniel Bell points out 
that, in his view, democracy and human rights are not useless terms for Confucian 
traditions and cultures but that their preferred interpretation is likely to be more 
elitist (democracy modifi ed to give a stronger voice to the ‘educated and wise’), 
more collectivist and more focused on material subsistence (human rights in terms of 
rights for communities and families rather than individuals and in terms of obtaining 
material prosperity before claiming political rights). 
 It can be safely assumed that Islamic and Hindu political and legal values also 
differ markedly from Western ones in various aspects. The costs for non-Western 
societies are mainly that they develop more slowly (if at all) than they otherwise 
would and that they may have corrupt political regimes that are unlikely to refl ect 
the concerns of the people but are held in offi ce by Western support. Moreover, 
Antony Anghie11 claims that the neo-liberal economic recipes that the IFIs provide to 
fi nancially ailing developing countries (privatisation, liberalisation and the creation 
of legal regimes facilitating commercial transactions and foreign investment) 
are even redolent of neo-colonialism. International organisations dominated by 
powerful shareholders continue to remodel non-Western countries after their own 
image. Imposing neo-liberal policies on developing countries has often aggravated 
unemployment and indebtedness in the long run and has at times even reinforced social 
tensions and ignited interethnic confl icts. The emphasis on free-market economics, 
an individualistic interpretation of civil and political human rights and certain 
forms of democracy has rarely resonated well in non-Western countries. Many have 
succumbed to IFI pressure and the ideological prevalence of neo-liberalism, in spite 
of the fact that their social context, cultural values and policy preferences were quite 
different from those promoted by the Fund and the Bank. In fact, as Robert Wade 
points out in ‘Japan, the World Bank and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance: The East 
Asian Miracle’ and ‘Showdown at the World Bank’,12 some Asian economies resisted 
World Bank pressure, held on to their own economic paradigm and ultimately fared 
better. But theirs was far from an easy struggle to win, even for a reputed economic 
giant like Japan, which set up Asian-style development programmes for its Asian 
neighbours, thus presenting itself as an ideological rival to the more US-oriented 
World Bank. Countries such as South Korea, which did succumb, have not fared so 
well in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian fi nancial crisis. In fact, in Bad Samaritans: 
The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism, Ha-Joon Chang points 
out that what destroyed prosperity in economically successful Western countries as 
well as in his native Korea was protectionism and government intervention in the 
economy.13
 Within these IFIs, there is growing desire among governments of large 
countries (e.g. China, India, Indonesia and Brazil) to be treated on a par with the 
10 D. Bell, Beyond Liberal Democracy (Princeton/London, Princeton University Press 2006).
11 A. Anghie, ‘Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions and 
the Third World’ (2000) 32 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 243-290; 
and A. Anghie, ‘Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy and the 
Mandate System of the League of Nations’ (2002) 34 New York University Journal of International Law 
and Politics 513-633.
12 R. Wade, ‘Japan, the World bank, and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance: The East Asian Miracle in 
Political Perspective’ (1996) 1 New Left Review 217-239; and R. Wade, ‘Showdown at the World Bank’ 
(2001) 7 New Left Review 3-16.
13 H.-J. Chang, Bad Samaritans; The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism (New 
York, Bloomsbury Press 2008).
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Western countries, Japan and Saudi Arabia, since their growing importance in the 
global economy and in world politics has not yet become visible in the legal and 
organisational framework. Moreover, the informal custom that the president of the 
World Bank should always be a North American and that the president of the IMF 
should always be a European is peculiar, in light of the fact that the lion’s share of 
their funds is lent to developing countries and that their economies are affected by far 
the most heavily as a consequence of IFI interventions. This situation has negatively 
affected the legitimacy of IFIs in the eyes of many. Although the North Americans 
and Europeans who dominate these organisations in spite of their limited share in 
the world population seem reluctant to cede a share of their say to others, the IMF 
and the World Bank have adopted a limited set of adjustments aimed at enhancing 
the accountability of their operations, especially in the eyes of borrowing countries, 
such as publishing reports on-line and opening themselves up to NGO involvement. 
However, observers have concluded that the results are mixed and that much more 
far-reaching measures are needed.14 It is signifi cant in this regard that the size of 
the development aid investments of emerging non-Western donors such as China is 
rapidly growing in comparison to that of established Western donors, and that their 
conditions are often considered far more attractive by recipient countries than those 
imposed by IFIs, which sometimes require profound and painful policy changes. 
Since the Chinese lenders are less keen to impose ideological or good governance 
conditions on borrowing countries and the credibility of the Chinese economy has 
grown dramatically as a result of its economic success, Western countries in general 
and IFIs in particular will have to work on their international legitimacy if they are 
to continue playing a role of global signifi cance.15
 Decreasing acceptance of and rising resistance to Western political and economic 
recipes backed by asymmetrical legal frameworks puzzles few people in the world, 
except for most inhabitants of North America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand. 
The latter, after centuries of success, face the diffi culty of having to question their own 
ideological assumptions and legal frameworks. However, accepting this new reality 
on a voluntarily basis is not only politically expedient but also morally desirable. 
Adopting such a perspective would not only show respect for the cultural values 
and social settings of non-Western countries to guide their development policies but 
might also result in development policies attaining a higher degree of legitimacy at 
home. In fact, Western countries may even learn something by looking at others and 
fi xing weaknesses in their own systems.
 It is against this background that we approach and appreciate the concept 
of rule of law at the international level. With reference to Chesterman, we argue 
that it makes more sense to defi ne the international rule of law as a means rather 
than an end or as blueprint.16 The extraordinary support for the rule of law among 
theorists has been possible only because widely divergent views of what it means 
in practice were developed in parallel in different and sometimes wildly divergent 
administrative traditions. However, efforts to promote the rule of law through and 
within international organisations have necessitated a reassessment of this pluralism. 
We therefore propose a core defi nition of the rule of law as one closely connected to 
the pragmatic political ideal of legitimacy.
14 N. Woods and A. Narlikar, ‘Governance and the Limits of Accountability: The WTO, the IMF and 
the World Bank’ (2001) 170 International Social Science Journal.
15 N. Woods, ‘Whose Aid? Whose Infl uence? China, Emerging Donors and the Silent Revolution in 
Development Assistance’ (2008) 84(6) International Affairs 1205-1221; and M. Leonard, What Does 
China Think? (London: Fourth Estate 2007).
16 S. Chesterman, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 
3331.
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 With regard to this political ideal of legitimacy, we have made a normative choice 
here to respect cultural variety and encourage open dialogue on recipes for economic 
development among divergent global players and to let a legal framework evolve 
to accommodate this pluralism. This implies that we advocate a comparative law 
and legal transplantation method called ‘institutional transplantation’. Institutional 
transplantation deviates from legal transplantation in the sense that it pays specifi c 
attention to cultural and administrative congruence, thereby increasing the probability 
of acceptance and, thus, socio-cultural legitimacy in the state of adoption.
 For the purpose of this article we defi ne legitimacy here as consisting of two main 
components:
1) Legality, which refers to legal legitimacy. To achieve this, mere 
consideration of the legal validity of the transplantation process is 
suffi cient.
2) Acceptance, which refers to cultural legitimacy. For this, a transplant 
also needs to be congruent with the social context, cultural values and 
political preferences of the adopting entity.
Although the effectiveness of an economic development policy resulting from a 
transplantation process is obviously not irrelevant, we will not deal with it here. In 
this article, we analyse the meaning that the theory on institutional transplantation 
can have for the establishment of international organisations in accordance with the 
rule of law, i.e. the establishment of legitimate international organisations.
3 The Institutional Transplantation Method
Students of comparative law are generally familiar with ‘legal transplantation’,17 
which implies the transfer of constitutional, organic or other legal frameworks or 
pieces of legislation from one constituency to another, most usually from country 
to country. This practice has a long history in the form of forced adoption under 
colonisation and political domination and has led to the prevalence of civil law, 
common law, Soviet law and Islamic law around the world. In more recent times, 
forced adoption has faded into the background and been replaced by the imitation 
and emulation of legal frameworks and practices of leading nations by those that are 
considered and/or consider themselves to be economic, political and legal laggards. 
More often than not, international benchmarks encourage countries to engage in 
legal transplantation, and international organisations obviously play a large role in 
this area.
 Legal transplantation is a species of a more general genus known as ‘policy 
transfer’18 or ‘lesson-drawing’,19 which was developed in political science and 
revolves around the practice of adopting policy ideas, models or programmes 
developed elsewhere. The copying of legislation and regulation, then, is considered 
to be a component or aspect of a much wider phenomenon. It is therefore important 
to note that ‘legal transplantation’ normally just refers to the legal side of the 
phenomenon, which generally does not take the social functionality of the transplant 
into consideration. It focuses mainly on legality, not cultural acceptance. In 
17 A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (Athens, University of Georgia 
Press 1993).
18 D. Dolowitz and D. Marsh, ‘Who Learns What from Whom: A Review of the Policy Transfer 
Literature’ (1996) 44 Political Studies 343-357.
19 R. Rose, Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy: A Guide to Learning across Time and Space (Chatham, 
Chatham House 1993); and R. Rose, Learning from Comparative Public Policy: A Practical Guide 
(London/New York: Routledge 2005).
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comparative law, only the functionalist approach to legal transplantation encourages 
sensitivity to the social context in which transplants take place. Although we feel that 
this approach is germane to ours, it lacks the necessary social science underpinnings 
to fulfi l this task and remains too abstract to lead to useful suggestions.
 When conducting a process of legal transplantation, it is obvious that one cannot 
say that anything goes. Apart from the fact that different legal systems sometimes 
depart from different premises and that incompatibilities might arise when elements 
of one system are incorporated into another system (legal congruence), there is also 
the issue of administrative and wider cultural congruence. If assumptions about 
citizens’ rights and duties, the powers and duties of governments and the separation 
of powers between the legislative, executive and judiciary in the country of adoption 
do not coincide with those in the legal framework on offer, the legitimacy and 
functionality of the transplant are bound to suffer. For example, the Chinese legal 
tradition that has developed in the past three decades formally attaches great value to 
the legality principle and in comparative terms also attaches greater value to citizens’ 
duties (as opposed to rights) than Western legal regimes. Legislative, executive 
and judiciary functions are ensconced in the bosom of the public sector but are not 
separated. Courts often act as administrative organs or produce documents telling 
executive organs how to interpret legislation passed by the Congress, while executive 
organs are not hierarchically lower than judiciary organs and can therefore dismiss 
the implementation of court orders.20 A superfi cial glance may give the impression 
that, since the People’s Republic of China has adopted many bodies of law from 
Europe and the United States, its extensive programme of legal transplantation has 
led to Westernisation. However, the basic ideas underlying the constitution and the 
way in which organic legislation and administrative practices have grown around it 
reveal that age-old Confucian ideas and more recent Communist party practices still 
permeate China’s legal system. 
 A sensible and thorough understanding of legal transplantation takes such 
deeper aspects into account in order to anticipate the consequences of Western-style 
transplants. This does not mean that adoption is impossible or illegitimate (in fact, 
Japan, Korea and China have done it many times and have become experts at it), but 
the outcome may diverge wildly from what donors expect and the legitimacy of the 
exercise is largely dependent on the question whether the recipient country has been 
able or allowed to express its wishes and needs. Interestingly, Far Eastern countries 
have been able or allowed to exercise the freedom to set up transplantation processes 
that meet their needs and have thrived after doing so, while many other non-Western 
countries have not been able to do so. As a result, their legislative frameworks are 
often incongruent with local practices and therefore suffer from serious legitimacy 
problems. Apart from more ancient leftovers from the colonial era, there are also more 
recent legal transplants. These were more or less imposed by IFIs that bartered new 
loans for compliance with Western-style economic policy solutions. In fact, radical 
analysts argue that the IMF and the World Bank are the neo-colonial continuation 
of Western tutelage21 and that they are thus responsible for the lack of congruence, 
legitimacy and functionality of modern transplants in developing countries.
20 D. Chow, The Legal System of the People’s Republic of China (St Paul , MN, Thomson West 2003).
21 A. Angie and B. S. Chimmi, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual 
Responsibility in International Confl ict’ (2003) 2 Chinese Journal of International Law 77-103.
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 It is here that the wider concept of ‘institutional transplantation’ comes into play. 
Institutional transplantation,22 or institutional transfer,23 refers to the transfer of 
policy ideas and institutions from one legal context to another. It has been derived 
from bodies of theory such as legal transplantation in comparative law,24 lesson-
drawing,25 policy transfer26 and policy convergence27 in political science. In effect, it 
has become a blend of legal, political and cultural academic insights and emphasises 
the distinction between formal institutions (political and legal), on the one hand, 
and informal institutions (social and cultural) on the other. Formal institutions can 
be defi ned as legal rules, regulations and procedures, whereas informal institutions 
are the social practices and rituals around them, based on underlying cultural values 
and norms. Consequently, institutional transplantation has become a version of legal 
transplantation in which aspects of legal and administrative culture are explicitly 
taken into account.
 In general, institutional transfer processes target formal legal institutions. 
Installing legal safeguards to ensure that international law and legal bodies introduce 
and sanction the rule of law can be seen as an example of this aim. This can be 
regarded as the promotion of having the legality principle in place around the world 
and ensuring political and civil rights in all countries. However, if the informal 
institutions are not transformed, or if no new body of informal practices develops 
around a new legal transplant, such transplants will merely be a dead letter and 
will not enjoy any acceptance or functionality. One could say that, by means of 
the legal transplant, legality has been formally safeguarded but that it has not been 
absorbed into the wider social environment and thus ‘institutionalised’. This lack 
of acceptance causes a serious legitimacy problem, and the new legal transplant 
and its wider administrative and cultural environment remain incongruent. This 
explains why the concepts of capitalism, democracy and human rights often receive 
such a bad press in many non-Western countries. It may be true that many Africans, 
Asians and Latin Americans truly do not like these legally enforced values, but it is 
more likely that the way in which they are currently interpreted and promoted at the 
international level has something to do with this resentment. 
 The very assumptions underlying the rule of law are currently based on 
individualistic and egalitarian Western values. When these are automatically taken as 
a starting point for international law-making, mismatches, dissatisfaction and confl ict 
are bound to arise. Again, this does not mean per se that the rule of law as such has 
no universal or global merit, but it does mean that its interpretation and practical 
implementation have to be redebated among all adopting states. To acquire global 
legitimacy, the rule of law may also require reinterpretation and reformulation or a 
specifi cation as to which of its elements are truly universal and which are particular 
to certain groups of states. It may even be that Western representatives become 
acquainted with new values that were never protected in Western societies but may 
actually be quite worthwhile, such as the value of family or community rights in 
combating alienation, the importance of strong state power to generate economic 
22 M. de Jong, Institutional Transplantation: How to Adopt Good Transport Infrastructure Decision-
Making Ideas from Other Countries (Delft, Eburon 1999); and M. de Jong, K. Lalenis and V. Mamadouh, 
The Theory and Practice of Institutional Transplantation, Experiences with the Transfer of Policy 
Institutions (Deventer, Kluwer 2002).
23 W. Jacoby, Imitation and Politics; Redesigning Modern Germany (Ithaca/London, Cornell 
University Press 2000).
24 Watson, above n. 17; and D. Nelken and E. Orucu, Comparative Law: A Handbook (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing 2007).
25 Rose (1993), above n. 19; and Rose (2005), above n. 19.
26 Dolowitz and Marsh, above n. 18.
27 C. Knill, The Europeanisation of National Administrations: Patterns of Institutional Change and 
Persistence (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2001).
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growth or the relevance of having a minimum level of economic prosperity and 
literacy in place before free elections are allowed. Most Westerners demonstrate 
a natural reluctance to even consider these issues, thus depriving themselves of 
opportunities to gain a deeper insight into alternative cultural values and economic 
choices and spot weaknesses in their own models.
 In sum, the theory of institutional transplantation highlights the importance of 
informal institutional preconditions for legitimising transfer of formal institutions. 
Of course, it is not unthinkable that informal institutions are altered over time by the 
establishment of new formal institutions (a process known as ‘modifi cation’), but the 
opposite is more likely: if informal institutions are incongruent with newly implanted 
formal ones, it is the latter that will prove to be unpopular and dysfunctional among 
the population at large and possibly also among policy-makers and legal scholars.
 There is currently little empirical evidence pertaining to either legal or institutional 
transplantation from the level of the state to international organisations, but similar 
mechanisms are at play there. The people involved in the design and establishment 
of international organisations are citizens of states and usually work for national 
governments, which have to approve of their work. In addition, policy-makers 
involved in transplanting formal institutions to the international level currently rely 
mainly on national sources and national legal frameworks. In the next section, we 
explain how the heuristics for institutional transplantation can be applied to the 
establishment of legitimate organisations at the international level.
4 Heuristics for Institutional Transplantation at the International 
Level
In a previous work, we proposed a number of important design heuristics for good 
institutional transplantation.28 However, these heuristics are primarily based on case 
studies of state-to-state or city-to-city transplantation, so adjustment for national to 
international level transfers is required. What is known, mainly from research carried 
out in the framework of political and policy studies, is that
1) legal and policy frameworks adopted at the international level (whether 
in the European Union or by the United Nations) are often derived from 
proposals that are made by one or more dominant, proactive national 
members and are subsequently often adopted in revised form following 
reactions from more recessive, reactive members;29
2) experts that operate in policy networks at various levels (local, regional, 
national and international) have a vital role to play in the spreading of 
ideas in various corners by acting as transfer agents of ideas. They pick 
them up in one policy arena, transform them to fi t their purposes and 
then coin them again in another policy arena.30
We will now proceed as follows. The currently known heuristics on institutional 
transplantation will be taken as a starting point for devising a framework for the 
development of legitimate international law and governance at global level in a broad 
sense (incorporating both legality and acceptance). Immediately after formulating 
28 De Jong, above n. 22; and De Jong et al., above n. 22.
29 C. T. Ramaekers, ‘The Infl uence of the Arhus Convention on Public Participation in French and 
Dutch Infrastructure Projects’ (Delft University of Technology master’s thesis 2004).
30 Diane Stone, ‘Transfer Agents and Global Networks in the “Transnationalization” of policy’ (2004) 
11(3) Journal of European Public Policy 545-566.
320 MARTIN DE JONG AND SUZAN STOTER 
these state-to-state heuristics, we will transform them in such a way that they become 
suitable, in our view, for state-to-international level transplantations. This is what we 
will do in the remainder of this section.
 After that, in sections 5 and 6, we will use the case of the World Bank’s Inspection 
Panel to illustrate what such a translation means for a specifi c case of institutional 
transplantation from national to international level. We realise that, on the basis 
of this article, it is only possible to provide a rough draft of the implications of 
applying the heuristics of institutional transplantation. More extensive and empirical 
research is needed to be able to draw fi rmer conclusions. However, we think that 
the description of the case of the Inspection Panel is useful, because it at least 
provides some preliminary insight into the usefulness of the theory on institutional 
transplantation for enhancing the legitimacy of international law and governance.
Heuristic 1: Strengthen the position of international proponents of change
Voluntary adoption or even forced imposition normally only leads to legitimate 
transplants if there is a critical mass of domestic proponents of institutional change 
whose position is strengthened during and as a result of the transplantation.
 - For international law-making and governance, this heuristic implies that 
transplants will only take root if the position of reformers and proponents 
of institutional change within the international body is strengthened. 
Regular contacts with these reformers should be maintained, but they 
should not be put under pressure. Instead, they should be allowed to 
decide the agenda and be given leeway in the way they incorporate 
the change in their administrative practices. National representatives 
(usually Westerners) should not take their place or corner them by 
giving strict directions. They should cater to the recipients’ needs rather 
than showing that they know how things should be done.
Heuristics 2a, b and c: Avoid ‘xeroxing’ – use multiple models and go from 
the general to the specifi c
‘Xeroxing’ (copycat transplantation) invariably leads to illegitimate and ineffective 
transplantation. ‘Bricolage’, i.e. adaptation to local circumstances through mutual 
adjustment by domestic players in a tinkering process, will lead to policy and legal 
constructions that are more in line with domestic needs and wishes (heuristic 2a). 
Considering multiple models and generating compatible creative combinations 
(hybrids or syntheses) generally leads to more legitimate transplantation than 
adopting only one model. This is because tinkering with various models allows for 
more creativity and suitability and creates more space for bargaining among various 
domestic players (heuristic 2b). Using the generic character of a transplant rather than 
specifi c, detailed legal frameworks or procedures is key to enhancing its legitimacy 
and functionality. More general and abstract policy lessons, ideas and ideologies can 
give direction, but detailed legislation is necessarily very context-specifi c and should 
only receive attention in the implementation phase of the transplant (heuristic 2c).
 - For international law-making and governance, this heuristic implies 
that national members that promote legal or policy frameworks should 
never push for the adoption of an exact copy of their model and that 
there is no such thing as a one-size-fi ts-all best practice that transcends 
the cultural context. The most appropriate tailor-made legislation is 
produced in a debate and bargaining process among various member 
states in which the most promising and appropriate models are compared 
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and synthesised. A general political debate should precede the drafting 
of the actual legal framework; the latter is merely the conclusion of the 
transplantation process, not its starting point.
Heuristic 3: Hire and use proactive institutional entrepreneurs
Hiring one or more energetic, charismatic and knowledgeable institutional 
entrepreneurs is vital to having the transplant accepted and adopted at all. In order 
to generate legal and policy change, many barriers need to be overcome, and this 
requires enthusiasm, perseverance and expertise. Psychology and staffi ng aspects 
are often ignored in the legal and policy sciences, but this is unjustifi ed.
 - For international law-making and governance, this heuristic implies 
that such competent institutional entrepreneurs should preferably not 
only occupy key power positions inside those organisations but also 
but also serve as transfer agents linking the national and international 
levels.
Heuristic 4: Recognise and use windows of opportunity when they appear
Being able to spot and utilise emerging windows of opportunity in order to generate 
change in international organisations (e.g. after disasters and/or media reports) to 
propel and effectuate the transplantation process is equally crucial to having an 
initiative adopted successfully and garnering the necessary support of the participants. 
Transplants are experienced as far more legitimate if a legal or institutional system 
is felt to be in a state of crisis or emergency. This may be a rather questionable issue 
for legal scholars, but political scientists have long been aware that people fi rst need 
to acknowledge problems before they can be open to changes that can improve the 
situation for all concerned.
 - For international law-making and governance, this heuristic implies that 
national and international proponents of change should capitalise on 
acute crises or overtly failing policy systems at national or international 
level in order to submit proposals that were already prepared and drafted 
before and which they have long been wishing to see implemented. 
It essentially means that it is important to get the political timing for 
the initiation of the transplantation process right. At such ‘critical 
junctures’, the context is likely to strengthen the proponents of such 
proposals strong and weaken their opponents.
Heuristic 5: Account for cultural and administrative differences and 
similarities
Taking cultural and administrative similarities and differences into account during 
the transplantation processes is important in order to anticipate the occurrence of 
possible acceptance problems. Overall, transplantation between countries belonging 
to the same family of nations is easier to realise, but this is not always desirable. Legal 
and cultural similarities between donor and recipient facilitate the transplantation 
process, but only if subtle institutional differences are still taken into account in such 
cases. In other words, like-to-unlike transfers (cross-family transplantation) are more 
complicated than like-to-like transfers, but in both cases the anticipation of divergence 
is still a precondition for a legitimate transfer. In like-to-like transplantations, the 
likelihood of this problem being underestimated is higher.
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 - For international law-making and governance, this heuristic implies that 
substantial legal, administrative and cultural awareness is required of the 
various groups of states that will be constituencies in the international 
organisation to which the transplantation takes place. This should 
be the case both in terms of basic constitutional, administrative and 
cultural assumptions and with regard to the sector-specifi c institutional 
arrangements in those countries. Constructive dialogue between 
national/international donors and national/international recipients about 
these assumptions is necessary. If international treaties, agreements or 
pieces of legislation are produced, these should be suffi ciently generic 
or fl exible to allow for a variety of administrative and culture-specifi c 
interpretations. If the process results in stricter legal documents that 
apply to a variety of states, these should represent an innovative 
legal conception that exceeds those of the constituencies and should 
be explicitly endorsed by representatives from these various legal, 
administrative and cultural families.
Heuristic 6: Use only neutral or positive symbols
Ensuring that controversial political, legal, ideological, cultural and/or religious 
symbols attached to the transplant are avoided and that positive connotations are 
emphasised is extremely important for increasing its chances of acceptance. Since 
institutional transplants are ultimately rarely value-neutral and country representatives 
tend to have emotional mental imprints of others, this will affect the feasibility and 
shape of a transplant, even if this is not ‘rational’.
 - For international law-making and governance, this heuristic implies that 
explicit reference to controversial world hegemons or rogue states is to 
be avoided. Representatives of all constituent states of an international 
organisation are unlikely to embrace a transplant whose origins are 
explicitly stated as being in the United States, the People’s Republic of 
China or Saudi Arabia. Similarly, only negative lessons can normally 
be drawn from Yugoslavia, Myanmar or Sudan, since positive reference 
to them is bound to lead to mixed emotions in many places around the 
world. Conversely, references to Sweden, South Korea or Botswana 
can be made more easily, because these countries are seen as leading 
and successful policy pioneers on their continents and are not tainted by 
connotations of imperialism, war crimes or extreme ideologies.
Institutional transplantation is aimed not only at realising legality but also at achieving 
acceptance of policy initiatives among recipient countries or institutions. This implies 
that the sense of institutional and project ‘ownership’ among borrowing countries in 
their dealings with the World Bank might grow if the above-mentioned heuristics 
are applied. The applicability of these heuristics will now be tested in the case of 
the World Bank’s Inspection Panel. The expectation underlying this institutional 
adjustment enacted in 1993 was that it would lead precisely to such a growing sense 
of ‘ownership’ among borrowing countries in relation to the development projects 
that they ‘co-partner’ with the World Bank, thus enhancing the legitimacy of these 
projects.31
31 Woods (2000), above n. 7; Woods (2001), above n. 7; and Woods and Narlikar, above n. 14.
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5 The Inspection Panel of the World Bank
5.1 History and Foundation
During the last decade, the acceptance has grown that international organisations, 
including the World Bank, should be held responsible for their activities that cause 
harm. However, non-state actors that are adversely affected by the Bank’s projects do 
not have an effective remedy, especially before national courts where international 
organisations enjoy immunity.32 Therefore, if national courts are unavailable, some 
alternative forum is necessary to enable non-state actors to pursue their claims, 
possibly within the structure of the relevant institution.33 If this reasoning is applied 
to the World Bank, compliance with the Bank’s developmental purposes implies a 
requirement to provide some forum for individuals and groups that are adversely 
affected by the Bank’s projects to pursue claims against the Bank. These factors may 
explain why, in the early 1990s, the Bank’s directors and management started to look 
for alternative means of accountability, such as the establishment of an independent 
inspection function within the Bank’s structure. This was viewed as a response to the 
increased recognition that the Bank’s projects were not always of adequate quality 
and sometimes had an adverse, and often irreversible, impact on the environment 
or on local populations. The Bank was disregarding its policies on involuntary 
resettlement and knowingly tolerated borrowers’ violations of its policies. As a 
consequence, Resolution No. 93-10 of the board of executive directors of the World 
Bank established the World Bank Inspection Panel. The members of the fi rst Panel 
were appointed in 1994. The Bank’s executive directors reviewed the Resolution in 
1996 and 1999.34
 The Inspection Panel is an investigative, not a judicial body and is based 
in Washington, D.C.35 The scope of the Panel’s mandate extends to IBRD loans 
and IDA credits, but not to projects fi nanced by other member institutions of the 
World Bank Group.36 Although the Inspection Panel is part of the World Bank, it is 
supposed to work as an independent body. Paragraph 4 of the Resolution states that 
the members of the Panel shall be selected, among other things, on the basis of ‘their 
independence from the Bank’s Management’.
 One of the reasons for establishing the Panel was to provide greater transparency 
in the World Bank’s operations. This is clearly refl ected in Paragraphs 25 and 26 of 
the Resolution, which provide that, after the executive directors have considered a 
request for inspection, the Panel’s recommendation and the decision of the executive 
directors shall be made available to the public.37
5.2 Composition of the Panel
The Panel consists of three members of different nationalities who are nominated by 
the World Bank’s president and appointed by the executive directors for fi ve years. 
32 Orakhelashvili, above n. 6, at 59.
33 Id., at 60.
34 Id., at 60-61.
35 For more information, see: <http://www.worldbank.org/inspectionpanel>.
36 M. Ragazzi, ‘IBR & IDA: Inspection Panel Operating Procedures, Including Executive Directors’ 
Resolution and Explanatory Memorandum of the General Council: Introductory Note’, 34 ILM 1995 at 
503.
37 Id., at 503.
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The chairperson of the Panel is elected for one year.38 There is no requirement of fair 
and equitable geographic representation. In fact, the majority of the Panel has always 
been represented by the nationals of Western countries.39
 Members are selected on the basis of the criteria set out in the Resolution.40 
The paramount consideration is independence: members cannot serve for more 
than one term (Paragraph 3), are independent from the World Bank’s management 
(Paragraph 4), if previously employed by the World Bank Group may serve on the 
Panel only if two years have elapsed since the end of their employment (Paragraph 
5), are disqualifi ed from participation in cases where they have a personal interest 
or have had a signifi cant involvement (Paragraph 6), can only be removed for cause 
(Paragraph 8) and cannot be employed by the World Bank Group after serving on the 
Panel (Paragraph 10). At the same time, the members of the Panel are offi cials of the 
World Bank. As such, they are bound by the obligations set out in Paragraphs 3.1(c) 
and (d) and 3.2 of the World Bank’s Principles of Staff Employment’.41
 The current members of the Panel have the following nationalities: Austrian 
(chairperson), Norwegian and Argentinean.
 Previous members had the following nationalities: Dutch, Thai, Ghanaian 
(chairperson), Canadian (chairperson), Costa Rican (chairperson), American 
(chairperson) and German (chairperson).42
5.3 Powers and Procedures of the Panel43
The Panel has investigatory, advisory and rule-making powers:44
 - Investigatory: The Panel can investigate complaints involving the 
Bank’s failure through act or omission to follow its ‘operational policies 
and procedures’.
 - Advisory: The Panel will review all complaints and make 
recommendations to the executive director about which complaints to 
investigate.
 - Rule-making: The Panel has the power to formulate the procedural rules that will 
govern the complaints process and to resolve the issues not clarifi ed in the Resolution.
The procedure that may lead to an investigation starts when the Panel receives 
a request for inspection. A request may originate from: (a) an affected party that 
consists of any two or more persons with common interests or concerns and who are 
in the borrower’s territory; (b) in special cases an executive director; or (c) at any 
time the executive directors acting as the board. An affected party may be represented 
by a local representative or, when this is impossible, a foreign representative.
 There must be an allegation that the World Bank has failed to comply with its 
operational policies and procedures. This expression includes the World Bank’s 
operational policies, bank procedures, operational directives and earlier similar 
documents but does not concern guidelines, best practices and similar documents.
38 Orakhelashvili, above n. 6, at 65.
39 Id., at 66.
40 Resolution No. IBRD 93-10 and Resolution No. IDA 93-6: ‘The World Bank Inspection Panel’.
41 Ragazzi, above n. 36, at 504-505.
42 This is the current list as published on the website of the Inspection Panel.
43 For further details, see the document ‘The Inspection Panel: Operation Procedures’.
44 D. D. Bradlow and S. Schlemmer-Schulte, ‘The World Bank’s New Inspection Panel: A Constructive 
Step in the Transformation of the International Legal Order’ (1994) 54 Zeitschrift fur auslandisches 
offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht at 393 and 397-398.
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 Before hearing a request, the Panel must satisfy itself that the alleged failure to 
comply with the World Bank’s operational policies and procedures has or threatens 
to have a material adverse effect on the rights or interests of an affected party, that 
the alleged violation is serious and that the subject matter of the request has been 
brought to the attention of the World Bank management. Under Paragraph 14 of the 
Resolution, the Panel cannot hear requests relating to actions that are the responsibility 
of other parties (most importantly the borrowing state) and do not involve actions or 
omissions of the World Bank, procurement decisions by the World Bank’s borrowers 
and matters concerning which the Panel has already made a recommendation, unless 
there are new circumstances that would justify the hearing of a new request.
 The procedure triggered by a request for inspection is described in detail in 
Paragraphs 16 to 23 of the Resolution. Paragraph 23 provides that for projects under 
preparation the fi ndings of the Panel on whether the World Bank has complied with 
its policies and procedures will be discussed in the Staff Appraisal Report. This is 
a technical document circulated to the executive directors that assesses the intrinsic 
quality of a project and evaluates the critical risks to which the project is exposed. 
The Panel’s administrative procedures specify that, if there is an investigation, 
the Panel may employ consultants selected in accordance with the principles and 
procedures applicable to the hiring of consultants by the World Bank’.45
 The actual course of events is as follows. Once the complaint is lodged and the 
Panel decides on its eligibility, its opinion is submitted to the board of executive 
directors, which decides whether or not to authorise an investigation. When 
the investigation is authorised, the Panel starts with the collection of all factual 
information. After that, the Panel may visit (with the consent of the borrowing state) 
the area to which the complaint relates. During the visit, the Panel meets with the 
complainants, the local population, the local authorities, representatives of NGOs 
and relevant experts. The Panel analyses the complaints and compares the factual 
circumstances with the documents of the project and the procedures and policies of 
the World Bank. The analysis results in a report and recommendations to the board 
of executive directors. Finally, it is up to the board of executive directors to make a 
decision based on the report of the Inspection Panel.
5.4 Comments on the Strength and Functioning of the Panel
According to Alexander Orakhelashvili, the legal nature of the Panel, as clarifi ed 
in the general context of the law of international organisations, is not always well 
refl ected in its working procedures and powers under its constituent documents. The 
limited powers of the Panel generate serious concerns when considering a transplant 
of this development into other organisations. To alleviate these concerns, a further 
progressive development of the Panel’s role and powers is necessary, according 
to Orakhelashvili.46 For example, a Statute for the Inspection Panel that governs 
the Panel’s activities and thus renders remote the diffi culties connected with the 
interpretation of its powers and functions should be adopted. Other suggestions 
concern the extension of the Panel’s powers, the ability to accept a request independent 
of any decision of another organ, fair and equitable representation within the Panel 
and guarantees for due process and equal application of the law.
 In an article entitled ‘Problems in Connection with the Effi ciency of the World 
Bank Inspection Panel’,47 Nurmukhametova points out that, under the Resolution, 
the Panel is supposed to determine whether or not management has been in 
45 Ragazzi, above n. 36, at 505-506.
46 Orakhelashvili, above n. 6, at 100-102.
47 Nurmukhametova, above n. 6, at 418-421.
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compliance with all the relevant policies and procedures of the Bank and has to make 
recommendations whether to proceed with the investigation of a request. However, 
it is not supposed to provide recommendations on the subject itself. This is a major 
obstacle according to Nurmukhametova. Too often, the Panel’s recommendations 
and the subsequent board decision provide only for a brief period of change. The 
main reason for this problem is the Panel’s mandate, according to which the its 
competence to suggest remedies is limited. According to Nurmukhametova, the 
Panel’s mandate should be broadened. It should include, among other things, post-
investigation control and a ‘preventive function’. However, successful reforms 
depend on the World Bank’s willingness.
 Shihata, who has written an elaborate study on what the actual experience with 
the Inspection Panel has been, has an answer to the above mentioned criticism.48 
In his view, a closer look should be taken at the function and functioning of the 
Inspection Panel in its interplay with the World Bank as a whole. If the constituent 
states of the World Bank are of the opinion that the Panel’s mandate is unduly limited 
in scope and that the Panel should have decision-making powers, an entirely different 
body should be established in a different context, with all the problems this will 
bring along. Some aspects of the Panel could possibly be clarifi ed or improved, but 
according tot Shihata this was done, at least partly, in the 1996 and 1999 revisions. 
Prior to more changes, a fundamental discussion is needed on the task description of 
the World Bank itself.
6 Transplanting Institutional Elements to the Inspection Panel49
When applying the heuristics of institutional transplantation to the World Bank’s 
Inspection Panel, we should not constrain ourselves to the relationship between the 
national level of the constituent states of the World Bank and the international level of 
the Panel. Looking at its structure and procedures, we do not see the Inspection Panel 
as an independent international organisation but as a part of the World Bank, since its 
tasks are functional to the policies and activities of the World Bank. There is a direct 
relationship between the policies and views of the World Bank and the states that 
donate the most funds to the Bank. These states have a relatively strong infl uence on 
the actions and policies of the Bank, which determine its generic character. Because 
the Bank plays an important role in the establishment and development of the Panel, 
the position of the Bank is an important part of the discussion on the heuristics of 
institutional transplantation.
6.1 Strengthen the Position of International Proponents of Change
In has been argued that the Panel’s establishment and work demonstrates that 
the independent inspection function is a necessary component of the World 
Bank’s development activities.50 On this basis, the Inspection Panel should have 
a fair number of proponents not only within the World Bank but also within the 
constituencies. However, various scholars argue that the World Bank only supports 
the Panel because it is crucial for its own legitimacy and functioning, but that the 
Bank is hostile to suggestions to strengthen the position of the Inspection Panel. In 
addition, it is worth noting that China, India and Brazil are opposed to the further 
48 I. F. I. Shihata, The World Bank Inspection Panel: In Practice (New York, Oxford University Press 
2000, 2nd ed.)
49 This section is based for a large part on the factual information in Shihata, above n. 48.
50 Orakhelashvili, above n. 6, at 100-102.
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enlargement of Inspection Panel’s competences and that they would like to see the 
infl uence of the Panel decrease. Thus, the social base for the current position of the 
Inspection Panel is liable to decrease. The support for the proposed strengthening 
of the position of the Panel seems to be insuffi cient at this moment. This indicates 
that the critical mass of proponents within (and outside) the World Bank needs to 
be increased before measures to strengthen the Panel in a legitimate and successful 
way can even be designed. The World Bank and the Inspection Panel should take 
appropriate measures to accomplish this.
6.2 Avoid ‘Xeroxing’ – Use Multiple Models and Go from the General to 
the Specifi c
With respect to these heuristics, we need to make a distinction between the economic 
models that are promoted and applied by the World Bank and, consequently, by the 
Inspection Panel and the procedures and powers of the Inspection Panel itself.
 Beginning with the latter, the establishment and the functioning of the Panel 
should be regarded as a unique phenomenon in a specifi c context. Authors who 
promote the strengthening of the position of the Panel should be aware of the global 
and specifi c context of the Panel. The tendency to refer to and copy the structure and 
procedures of national or other international judicial bodies must be avoided.
 At this moment, it is diffi cult for us to examine to what extent existing frameworks 
and procedures have been used as models for the current structure of the Panel. 
The Panel has the features of an ordinary Western dependent investigative body. 
The fact that the position of the Panel is relatively weak, that its jurisdiction is 
relatively limited and that the board of executive members of the Bank can infl uence 
investigations are indications for the assumption that the World Bank has established 
a panel that does not interfere with its policies. For these reasons, it is defensible to 
argue that the ‘model’ of the World Bank has been xeroxed to the Inspection Panel.
 According to our interpretation of the rule of law and legitimacy, as discussed in 
section 2, the structure and procedures of the Inspection Panel can only satisfy these 
criteria if multiple models are used in a gradual process of mutual adjustment of all 
the actors involved. For this purpose, the policies of the World Bank and the related 
activities of the Inspection Panel should refl ect not only North American economic 
models but also other economic models, like the Asian or African models. The same 
can be said about the democratic, cultural and legal aspects of the World Bank.
 Another option is to turn the Inspection Panel into a body that is independent 
from the World Bank and to ensure that its structure and procedures are based on 
multiple models that refl ect the socio-economic features of donor countries as well 
as borrowing countries. With reference to the previous heuristic of the enhancement 
of the position of local proponents of such transplantation, we think this second 
option is not very likely to happen.
 Whatever option is chosen, a fundamental discussion should fi rst take place on 
the different, more general and abstract policy lessons, ideas and ideologies that 
can give direction. In this phase, the constituent partners should defi nitely avoid all 
deliberation and negotiation of the suitable legal framework, procedures and rules 
that are needed to implement the agreed policies and ideas. All effort should be 
used to narrow the substantial differences that exist between the different states on a 
global level. In order to comply in a legitimate way with the rule of law on a global 
level, it may be necessary for the partners to refl ect on their owns view on this 
concept and to modify them in such a way as to make room for other views. Only 
after the constituent partners have agreed on a generic level can the designs for the 
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legal frameworks be discussed. These legal frameworks should be so fl exible that 
they can express and facilitate different legal values.
 Shihata, who extensively describes the establishment and the board reviews of 
the Inspection Panel’s experience, teaches that little discussion took place at the 
abstract level of policy ideas.51 From the beginning, the constituent partners of the 
Inspection Panel spoke about the desirable design of the legal framework and the 
required procedures. With respect to the heuristics of institutional transplantation, 
we regard the establishment and reviews of the Panel as a missed opportunity, which 
can have consequences for the social base of the Panel and thus for its legitimacy.
6.3 Hire and Use Proactive Institutional Entrepreneurs
Transplantations do not occur by themselves. Energetic and knowledgeable 
institutional entrepreneurs are vital to having the transplant accepted and adopted at 
all. In order to generate legal and policy change, many barriers need to be overcome, 
and this requires perseverance. Much attention needs to be paid to the psychological 
aspects of transplantation.
 Within the scope of this article, it is diffi cult for us to analyse to what extent 
well-qualifi ed institutional entrepreneurs have been involved in the establishment of 
the World Bank’s Inspection Panel. Additional empirical research data needs to be 
gathered for an analysis of this subject. In any case, the relevant literature reveals 
that many authors are critical of the weak position of the Inspection Panel and that 
they have suggested many changes to strengthen the Panel. In our opinion, these 
criticisms can be seen as an indication that, if the powers and the position of the 
Inspection Panel are to be strengthened, this change can only be made if there are 
enough suffi ciently qualifi ed institutional entrepreneurs available. In the case of 
transplantation to an international organisation such as the Inspection Panel, these 
entrepreneurs should not only occupy key positions within the World Bank but also 
serve as agents linking the national and international levels.
6.4 Recognise and Use Windows of Opportunity When They Appear
Transplants are experienced as far more legitimate if a legal or institutional system is 
felt to be in a state of crisis or emergency. In our opinion, it is defensible to argue that 
the increasing criticism of the World Bank and its policies during the last fi fteen years 
of the previous century were an important factor in the establishment of the Inspection 
Panel. Although there were also mounting internal factors relating to concerns about 
performance, the failures that were made by the Bank in the Narmada projects are 
generally seen as the external cause for the establishment of the Inspection Panel.52
 For further development of the current position and powers of the Inspection 
Panel, there therefore has to be a general awareness and a sense of urgency. Not only 
national governments but also interest groups, NGOs and academics can contribute 
to the emergence of this sense by actively participating in (public) debates on the 
functioning of the Inspection Panel with reference to its purposes.
 Another option is that the World Bank will realise that its current position cannot 
be maintained because of the rising powers of non-Western states. This causes 
particular problems, because larger developing countries are not in favour of the 
Inspection Panel, which they regard as indirectly interfering with their sovereignty. 
Therefore, it is important that windows of opportunities are recognised and used to 
51 Shihata, above n. 48.
52 Id., at 2-8.
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design institutional improvements that take account of the objections of these states. 
We suggest that members of the World Bank and the World Bank itself take this 
heuristic of institutional transplantation into account.
6.5 Account for Cultural and Administrative Differences and Similarities
This heuristic implies that substantial legal, administrative and cultural awareness 
is required of the countries that will be affected by new legal and policy initiatives. 
In the case of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, both these institutions should be 
aware of the cultural and administrative differences between the states that donate 
the funds and the borrowing countries. For example, in all projects, the World Bank 
requires borrowing countries to provide large amounts of information; it is one of 
the tasks of the Inspection Panel to judge whether all the required information is 
available and whether the complaints are eligible in the context of the information. 
However, the World Bank and the Inspection Panel should be aware of the fact that 
in many countries informal relations are much more important then formal relations 
and that in those countries it is considered ‘a waste of time’ to collect information on 
the projects and to write reports. Of course, this does not mean that the World Bank 
or the funding states need to drop the wish to have some kind of information on and 
registration of how the money is spent. A dialogue should be started and explicit 
attention should be paid to the cultural and administrative differences between the 
member states, and these differences should be refl ected in the structure, policies and 
procedures of the World Bank and its Inspection Panel.
6.6 Use Only Neutral or Positive Symbols
In the case of the World Bank and its Inspection Panel, this heuristic implies that 
explicit reference to controversial hegemons or rogue states should be avoided. In 
this respect, the dominance of the North American and Western countries in the 
World Bank and the Inspection Panel is a ‘dead-end road’. The construction of these 
kinds of international organisations should be based on an inventory of different 
best practices from all over the world. The typically Asian value of harmony and 
soft pressure in settling disputes of harm done by public agencies is increasingly 
valued in many countries over the American approach of advocacy, confrontation 
and litigation. It is important that these alternative values are explicitly taken into 
account in the discussions on improving and strengthening the position of the 
Inspection Panel. The governments (and people) of developing countries should also 
be able to identify with the proposed design of the reform.
7 Implication: Cross-Cultural Dialogue and the Rule of Law
The different aspects that legal scholars traditionally associate with the rule of 
law have had their merits in structuring Western societies through their legal 
systems. However, this praise does not imply that it can be safely assumed that 
their application around the world is unproblematic and universal. This article has 
emphasised that many underlying cultural and administrative premises determine 
whether transplanting legal constructs derived from rule of law principles in Western 
countries can be considered legitimate. Since we are convinced that legitimacy 
entails both legality and acceptance, it is not irrelevant that some legal constructs of 
European or North American origin do not resonate well in non-Western countries. 
International organisations consisting of and dealing with representatives of such 
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countries are experiencing mounting resistance to their prescriptions for more 
capitalism, democracy, rule of law and human rights, in spite of the fact that Western 
countries usually occupy the leading positions in these organisations.
 To obtain legitimacy within such non-Western or mixed international environments, 
the rule of law and all it entails can no longer be considered an assumption but has 
become a set of constitutional and administrative values. Legitimate international 
policy-making and law-making require an acknowledgement of a variety of values 
and opinions and an attempt to synthesise them and incorporate this cross-cultural 
and administrative synthesis in international policy-making and law-making bodies. 
If only 12 per cent of the world population is ‘Western’ and 88 per cent is ‘other’, it 
is vital for the legitimate continuation of international bodies to pay due heed to the 
governments of those 88 per cent and what accountability, transparency, civil rights 
and sustainable economic institutions mean to them. Dialogue implies listening, 
not making assumptions, even where the rule of law is concerned. Such an open 
attitude does not imply that the representatives of Europe and North America have to 
give up their own value systems and the legal and political opinions based on them, 
but rather that their conception is merely their stake in a constructive bargaining 
process around international law-making. The Western conception is one among 
many, prone to its own strengths and weaknesses, like those taken from Confucian, 
Islamic and other families of states. John Gray has rightly described accepting ‘value 
pluralism’ and fi nding a ‘modus vivendi’ in dealing with tensions between political 
preferences deriving from different conceptions of the ‘morally good’ as the only 
viable course for future liberalism.53 We feel that the fi rst contribution this article 
makes to the literature on comparative law is the admonition that the cultural variety 
underlying legal systems is more than just a theoretical insight but that it also has 
practical implications for how international legal bodies operate and what policies 
they propagate.
 In this article, we have also pointed out that the method of institutional 
transplantation with its six heuristics is a promising way to embark on such an 
international dialogue-oriented process. Working out these heuristics for use 
within international legal bodies is the second main contribution of this article to 
comparative law. In this article, we have applied these heuristics to the World Bank’s 
Inspection Panel, thereby showing that the heuristics of institutional transplantation 
are valuable and useful for the development of legitimate international organisations. 
These heuristics do not only apply to the relevant legal framework(s) but also 
refer to the different underlying political and cultural traditions. Globally, the rule 
of law should be defi ned as a political ideal that can be enhanced by addressing 
administrative and cultural congruence. The theory on institutional transplantation 
can be helpful in the establishment of legitimate international organisations.
 In a restricted and formal sense, legal transplantation refers only to the national-
to-international transfer of rules and procedures and safeguards legality. However, 
achieving legality is normally far easier than obtaining actual administrative and 
wider societal acceptance. Only the latter implies full administrative legitimacy, 
while the former does not. We feel that it is wise for leading global organisations to 
engage in this more open approach to international policy-making and law-making. 
If they do not, they disregard the values, wishes and lifestyles of a large majority of 
the world’s population and may rapidly lose signifi cance in future decades, given the 
dynamics of geopolitics.
53 Gray (2002), above n. 8.
